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Introduction
The term "smart grid" generally refers to a next-genera-
tion power grid in which the generation, transmission, 
distribution,  and  management  of  electricity  are  up-
graded and automated by incorporating advanced com-
puting and communication technologies for improving 
the efficiency, reliability, economics, and safety of the 
grid.  Loosely  speaking,  a  smart  grid  is  composed  of  a 
power grid and a two-way communication network for 
information  retrieval  and  management.  When  com-
pared to legacy and closed power-control systems, the 
smart grid is envisioned to establish a scalable, pervas-
ive, and interactive communication infrastructure with 
new  energy-management  and  demand-response  cap-
abilities. During the past few years, smart-grid metering 
and  control  systems  have  been  widely  deployed 
throughout the world. According to a new Navigant Re-
search report (2013; tinyurl.com/m3qm7xx), the global mar-
ket  potential  for  smart-grid  equipment  manufacturers 
and  solution  providers  will  nearly  double  by  2020, 
reaching $73 billion in annual revenue and $461 billion 
in cumulative profit. 
A  smart  grid  brings  great  performance  benefit  to  the 
power industry and enables end users to optimize their 
power  consumption;  however,  the  heavy  dependence 
on communication networks has made smart grids vul-
nerable to a wide range of cyberspace threats. For ex-
ample,  it  has  been  shown  that  security  breaches  in 
smart  grids  can  result  in  a  variety  of  serious  con-
sequences, from blackouts and physical damage of in-
frastructure  to  the  leakage  of  customer  information. 
Considering the vast scale and complex architecture of 
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a smart grid, it is not difficult to understand that the vul-
nerabilities associated with the smart-grid communica-
tion  system  may  also  be  enormous.  Those  security 
vulnerabilities need to be properly addressed to ensure 
that smart grids are not only secure and function cor-
rectly, but that they also maximize their adoption and 
successfully  fulfill  the  promise  of  smart-grid  invest-
ment.
Although  most  of  the  architectures,  frameworks,  and 
roadmaps for smart grids have already been defined by 
the governments, industry, and academia, there are still 
many  important  security  and  privacy  issues  in  smart-
grid communications. These issues are now considered 
by governments and industry to be one of the highest 
priorities  for  smart-grid  design,  and  they  must  be  re-
solved before smart grids can be operationally ready for 
the market. In this article, we will present the high-level 
architecture of a smart-grid metering and control sys-
tem, and we will describe typical cyberspace attacks on 
smart-grid  communications.  We  also  will  summarize 
the  security  requirements,  review  some  existing  solu-
tions, and highlight several important directions along 
this emerging research line. 
The  remainder  of  this  article  is  organized  as  follows. 
First,  we  present  the  fundamental  architecture  and 
functionalities of a smart-grid metering and control sys-
tem.  Next,  we  focus  on  the  security  requirements  for 
smart-grid  communications,  followed  by  a  survey  of 
current efforts made by the industry and academia to 
secure the smart-grid networks and devices. Finally, we 
propose several research areas and directions in smart-
grid security and draw some conclusions. 
Architecture
A typical smart-grid metering and control system, as il-
lustrated  in  Figure  1,  consists  of  a  collection  of 
meters/sensors and controllers/actuators that commu-
nicate  with  a  substation/data-concentrator,  a  con-
sumer  or  technician,  and  various  third-party  entities. 
The  communication  among  different  network  entities 
is  realized  by  high-speed  wired  or  wireless  links  or  a 
combination  thereof.  A  smart-grid  metering  and  con-
trol  system  has  a  layered  network  structure  through 
which it collects data and controls the delivery of elec-
tricity. 
The main functionalities of each component in a smart-
grid metering and control system are as follows:
1. Utility company: connects to the substation network 
through the wide area network (WAN) interface and 
the  communication  channel  might  be  Wi-Fi,  satel-
lite, 4G-LTE, Wi-Max, etc. The utility company is re-
sponsible for processing alarms and alerts, managing 
the  meter  data,  and  generating  bills.  Moreover,  it 
may also provide a web portal that allows customers 
to view their monthly energy consumption and bills.
Figure 1. Architecture of a typical Smart-grid metering and control systemTechnology Innovation Management Review July 2013
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2.  Substation/data-concentrator  network:  consists  of 
a number of smart meters in a certain area as well as 
a  data  collector.  The  connection  between  smart 
meters  and  the  data  collector  might  through  Wi-Fi, 
ZigBee,  power  line  carrier  (PLC),  etc.  Typically,  the 
smart meters form a wireless mesh network and for-
ward  the  meter  readings  to  the  data  collector 
through  multi-hop  communications.  The  data  col-
lector  then  transmits  the  accumulated  data  to  the 
utility company.
3. Home area network (HAN): provides the consumer 
access  points  to  control  and  monitor  the  real-time 
power consumption. The HAN contains a home gate-
way that receives the power-consumption data from 
the  smart  meter  and  displays  it  on  householder's 
devices  (e.g.,  laptop,  tablet,  smartphone).  Further-
more,  the  home  gateway  may  send  the  power  con-
sumption data to a third party for other value-added 
services  (e.g.,  efficiency  advice,  supplier  selection). 
The  HAN  also  includes  a  controller  that  enables 
householders to remotely control the status of their 
home appliances.
4.  Smart  meter:  is  composed  of  a  microcontroller,  a 
metrology board, and a communication board. Un-
der the control of the microcontroller, the metrology 
board  measures  the  real-time  power  consumption, 
and the meter data is transmitted to both the substa-
tion  network  as  well  as  the  home  area  network 
through  the  communication  board.  The  connection 
between the smart meter and home appliances may 
be through Wi-Fi, ZigBee, Ethernet, HomePlug, Wire-
less M-Bus, etc. The smart meter may also contain a 
disconnection function that (if enabled) allows utility 
companies or customers to remotely connect or dis-
connect the home appliances and services.
5.  Third  party:  relies  on  accurate  meter  readings  to 
provide  value-added  services  for  householders,  in-
cluding  power  efficiency  advice,  supplier  selection, 
etc. Those services will help householders to manage 
their power usage in a cost-effective way.
Requirements
The conventional power grid is composed of dedicated 
power devices that form closed networks with reliable 
and  predicable  communication  links.  In  contrast,  a 
smart-grid  metering  and  control  system  relies  on  ad-
vanced  wired  and  wireless  communication  networks, 
thereby  inheriting  all  of  the  weaknesses  and  potential 
cyberspace  vulnerabilities  of  general  communication 
networks. The smart-grid metering and control system 
is becoming an increasingly common target for cyber-
space attacks, and strong and robust security mechan-
isms  are  paramount  for  the  prevention  of  financial 
fraud, environmental accidents, and a host of other po-
tentially disastrous incidents. In this section, we discuss 
the  major  security  concerns  and  requirements  for 
smart-grid metering and control systems. 
Efforts from standards bodies and organizations
A number of organizations have been actively working 
on  the  development  of  smart  grid  security  require-
ments,  as  illustrated  in  Box  1.  Among  existing  smart-
grid  standardization  efforts,  the  NIST  Framework  and 
Roadmap  for  Smart  Grid  Interoperability  Standards 
and its Interagency Report, “Guidelines for Smart Grid 
Cyber Security” (NIST IR 7628;  tinyurl.com/yb6jpuw), rep-
resent the most comprehensive coverage of cyberspace 
security requirements in the smart grid. 
All  standards  bodies  consistently  specify  three  high-
level  smart-grid  security  objectives:  availability,  integ-
rity,  and  confidentiality.  However,  even  though  the 
standards  bodies  define  the  security  requirements 
based on a fairly comprehensive set of use cases in the 
power  industry,  there  is  still  a  considerable  gap 
between  understanding  the  security  requirements  in 
the  standards  and  applying  them  to  design  a  secure-
Box 1. Examples of organizations working on smart-
grid requirements
• Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI; epri.com)
• International Society of Automation (ISA; isa.org)
• IEEE 1402-2000 (tinyurl.com/ox786r8)
• International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC; 
iec.ch)
• National Energy Board (NEB, Canada; neb-one.gc.ca)
• North American Electrical Reliability Corporation-
Critical Infrastructure Protection (NERC-CIP; 
nerc.com)
• National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(NIST; nist.gov)Technology Innovation Management Review July 2013
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smart grid metering and control system. It is extremely 
important for designers and practitioners of smart grids 
to gain deep understanding about a wide range of mali-
cious attacks to the smart grid, as detailed below.
Availability
Availability refers to ensuring timely and reliable access 
to information, which is the primary security goal of a 
smart-grid metering and control system. Malicious at-
tacks targeting availability can be considered as denial-
of-service  attacks  (tinyurl.com/jzn67),  which  intend  to 
delay, block, or even corrupt the communication in the 
system. In particular, due to the extensive adoption of 
wireless communication technologies in the smart grid, 
a jamming attack (tinyurl.com/km9sd9) that fills the wire-
less  medium  with  noise  signals  has  become  the  most 
typical form of physical-layer attack. The jamming at-
tack is able to defer the transmission of messages and 
to distort the transmitted data signal. As a result, the le-
gitimate  receiver  cannot  recover  messages  out  of  the 
damaged data packets. Jamming attacks are more relev-
ant and serious in the smart grid than other than other 
networking systems, because the smart grid involves es-
sential resources for people’s everyday lives. On the oth-
er  hand,  many  man-in-the-middle  attacks  (tinyurl.com/
fco32) can be launched only when the full or partial com-
munication  channels  can  be  jammed.  Examples  in-
clude  jamming  then  inserting  false  location 
information and jamming then delaying the transmis-
sion.  Because  the  network  traffic  in  the  smart  grid  is 
generally time-critical, it is crucial to evaluate the im-
pact of denial-of-service attacks and to design efficient 
and effective countermeasures to such attacks. 
Integrity
Integrity refers to preventing or detecting the modifica-
tion or destruction of information by unauthorized per-
sons  or  systems.  Malicious  attacks  targeting  the 
integrity of a smart grid attempt to stealthily manipu-
late critical data such as meter readings, billing inform-
ation, or control commands. Recent research (Liu et al., 
2011;  tinyurl.com/kzaxzdy)  has  demonstrated  that  a  new 
class of attacks, called false data-injection attacks, are 
highly  viable  against  the  state  estimation  in  electrical 
power grids. Based on the assumption that an attacker 
has  compromised  one  or  several  smart  meters  and  is 
able to access the current power-system configuration 
information, such attacks can successfully inject arbit-
rary bogus data into the monitoring centre, and at the 
same time, pass the data-integrity checking used in cur-
rent  state-estimate  processes.  Integrity  protection  can 
be achieved by authentication, certification, and attest-
ation. More specifically, the smart devices and substa-
tion must authenticate each other’s identity to thwart 
impersonation.  Data  certification  of  a  message  pre-
vents  modification  of  data  during  transmission.  Data 
authentication with non-repudiation goes beyond certi-
fication by preventing the sender from claiming that it 
did  not  send  the  data.  Substations  use  attestation  to 
confirm that the memory contents (code and data) on a 
smart device have not been modified. The security ser-
vices related to integrity are usually implemented using 
public-key cryptography, which requires a trusted third 
party that hosts a key-management service.
Confidentiality
Confidentiality  refers  to  protecting  personal  privacy 
and proprietary information from unauthorized access. 
Malicious  attacks  targeting  confidentiality  aim  at  ob-
taining  desirable  information  (e.g.,  power  usage,  cus-
tomer’s  account  information)  through  eavesdropping 
on  communication  channels  in  a  smart-grid  metering 
and control system. Although such attacks have negli-
gible effects on the operation of the system, the trans-
mission  of  fine-grained  consumption  data  by  smart 
meters  has  raised  concerns  about  privacy.  Research 
(Quinn, 2009; tinyurl.com/pc2st2e) has shown that the con-
sumption  data  collected  by  smart  meters  reflects  the 
use of all electric appliances by inhabitants in a house-
hold over time, and it allows criminals to make infer-
ences about the behaviours, activities, or preferences of 
those inhabitants. Those privacy issues need to be ad-
dressed appropriately to reduce customers’ fears about 
potential leakages of their information. Some best prac-
tices  relating  to  privacy  have  been  proposed  for  the 
design  of  smart  grids  (Cavoukian,  2010;  tinyurl.com/
27r43ds). An emerging trend is for the smart meters to ag-
gregate  usage  data  for  billing  purposes  and  support 
load-balancing  and  other  monitoring  functions 
through  peer-to-peer  protocols  that  preserve  the  con-
sumer’s privacy. 
Current Approaches
Based on the security guidelines specified by the NIST 
and  other  standards  bodies,  both  industry  and  aca-
demia have made efforts to address the challenging se-
curity  issues  in  smart-grid  metering  and  control 
systems  by  employing  various  cryptographic  tech-
niques. Here, we give an overview of several existing cy-
ber-security  solutions  proposed  by  industry  and 
academia for smart-grid communications. Technology Innovation Management Review July 2013
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Cybersecurity solutions from industry
In 2007 a large stakeholder community was assembled 
by the ZigBee Alliance to address the security issues in 
the  smart  grid;  this  community  developed  what  is 
known  as  the  ZigBee  Smart  Energy  Profile  (SEP; 
tinyurl.com/kjfl96m). The ZigBee SEP has been widely ad-
opted  as  the  communication  infrastructure  in  home 
area  networks.  Regarding  to  the  security,  the  ZigBee 
SEP  specifies  that  each  smart  meter  should  be 
equipped  with  an  Elliptic  Curve  Qu-Vanstone  (ECQV; 
tinyurl.com/7v4f36a)  implicit  certificate  before  deploy-
ment. The ECQV certificate is much smaller than a tra-
ditional X.509 certificate (tinyurl.com/8e3zr), and it binds a 
meter’s MAC address and manufacture identifier to an 
ECC key pair (tinyurl.com/egz7y). Although the ECQV certi-
ficate  issuance  has  been  addressed  (Certicom; 
tinyurl.com/mbug9b),  the  certificate  renewal  and  revoca-
tion processes are not defined in the ZigBee SEP. 
For  supervisory  control  and  data  acquisition  (SCADA; 
tinyurl.com/jcrlz)  systems,  NIST  (2010;  tinyurl.com/mfrn42j) 
suggests  AES,  SHA-1,  and  RSA,  and  IEC  62351 
(tinyurl.com/29tm8ll)  specifies  RSA-1024.  However,  it  is 
now known that RSA is a poor choice for SCADA net-
works because of the high computation cost of RSA en-
cryption  and  the  limited  computing  power  of  SCADA 
devices.  The  Standards  Council  of  Canada  (tinyurl.com/
m4najzg)  and  the  European  Union  (tinyurl.com/kvmnswk) 
also define cybersecurity requirements for smart grids, 
but do not specify a suite of cryptographic algorithms 
to  meet  the  requirements,  except  that  the  Standards 
Council of Canada specifies that SHA be used as the se-
cure hash function. It remains an open research prob-
lem  to  find  a  set  of  cryptographic  algorithms  that 
provide  the  right  combination  of  security  and  imple-
mentability for the smart-grid metering and control sys-
tem.
Besides industry alliances and standards bodies, there 
are  a  number  of  manufacturers  of  smart  devices  for 
SCADA  networks  and  meters  for  smart  grids.  Imple-
mentation  details  for  these  devices  are  generally  con-
sidered  proprietary  information,  but  a  few 
generalizations  can  be  made.  The  cryptographic  al-
gorithms are implemented in software on a low-power 
16-bit  microprocessor.  RSA-1024  or  ECC-256/384  is 
used  for  public-key  services.  Symmetric  key  services 
use AES-128 or AES-256. Some devices use spread-spec-
trum  modulation.  Most  smart-device  manufacturers 
implement the security services themselves. A few com-
panies  have  a  hardware  security  module  (HSM; 
tinyurl.com/7r9v6rv) or similar product that is independent 
of  a  specific  smart  device.  SafeNet’s  PKI  HSM 
(tinyurl.com/k6mbobz)  provides  public  key  cryptography 
with  RSA-1024  and  ECC-256/384,  and  symmetric-key 
cryptography with AES-256 to perform attestation, key 
management,  encryption/decryption,  and  billing.  GE 
Digital Energy (tinyurl.com/lsjyqsl) makes a family of wire-
less routers with AES-128 designed to connect to smart 
meters  and  controllers.  Within  Canada,  Tofino  Secur-
ity’s  Industrial  Security  Solution  (tofinosecurity.com)  is  a 
server-side  software  program  combined  with  security 
devices that act as wired access points with encryption 
for meters and actuators. Bentek Systems’ SCADALink 
SMX900  (tinyurl.com/mrj74mb)  is  a  modular  wireless  re-
mote-terminal-unit/modem that supports spread-spec-
trum communication, but does not appear to have any 
facilities for encryption, authentication, etc. 
Cybersecurity solutions from academia
A critical component of smart grid security is key man-
agement, which will ensure the confidentiality, authen-
ticity,  and  integrity  of  devices  and  communications 
within  the  grid.  Most  previous  research  focused  on 
designing cryptographic protocols to provide certain se-
curity functionalities. 
Efficient  implementations  of  encryption  schemes  are 
essential  for  providing  confidentiality  in  a  smart  grid. 
An experimental study about the performance of a sym-
metric-key  cipher  (i.e.,  DES-CBC)  and  a  public-key 
cipher  (i.e.,  RSA)  on  an  intelligent  electronic  device 
(IED) called TS7250 has been conducted (Wang and Lu, 
2013; tinyurl.com/mlzypxp), where the IED is used for send-
ing  the  transformer  status  and  receiving  commands 
from  the  control  centre.  These  experimental  results 
show that the computational ability of an IED becomes 
a bottleneck for the delay performance when perform-
ing  asymmetric-key  cryptography.  These  authors  also 
suggested that a symmetric-key approach is more suit-
able for real-time IED communications in power distri-
bution and transmission systems.
Authentication is crucial to protect the integrity of data 
and devices in the smart grid. Due to the limited com-
putational  capabilities  of  devices,  stringent  timing  re-
quirements, and high data-sampling rates in the smart 
grid,  traditional  authentication  schemes  might  not  be 
applicable.  Moreover,  besides  supporting  basic  data 
and  device  authentication,  multicast  authentication  is 
another desirable feature due to the multicast nature of 
the smart-grid communication. A number of authentic-
ation schemes have been proposed in the literature for 
smart  grids.  Szilagyi  and  Koopman  (2009: 
tinyurl.com/k8pwh46 and 2010:  tinyurl.com/l93xwjs) proposed 
flexible and low-cost multicast authentication schemes Technology Innovation Management Review July 2013
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for embedded control systems. The basic idea is to veri-
fy  truncated  message  authentication  codes  (MACs) 
across multiple packets, thereby achieving a good trade-
off among authentication cost, delay performance, and 
tolerance  to  attacks.  Wang  and  colleagues  (2009; 
tinyurl.com/qxvb49v) proposed a fast multicast authentica-
tion  scheme  for  time-critical  messages  in  the  smart 
grid. Their scheme is based on an efficient variant of a 
one-time  signature  (OTS)  scheme.  Although  the  pro-
posed scheme is efficient in terms of computation, the 
public key size in an OTS-based scheme is quite large 
(i.e., on the order of 10KB). Hence, both communica-
tion  and  storage  overhead  are  significant  in  this  case. 
Lu  and  colleagues  (2012;  tinyurl.com/m3xfj5g)  conducted 
an empirical study for a few data-origin authentication 
schemes  in  substation  automation  systems  (SAS). 
These  authors  compared  the  performance  of  RSA, 
MAC, and OTS on a small-scale SAS prototype and con-
cluded that the existing authentication schemes cannot 
be applied directly into the SAS due to insufficient per-
formance  considerations  in  response  to  application 
constraints.
The heterogeneous communication architecture of the 
smart grid has made the key management particularly 
challenging, and it is not practical to design a universal 
key-management scheme for the entire smart grid. The 
simplest  way  is  to  use  a  single  key  shared  by  all  the 
meters  in  the  smart  grid.  However,  this  solution  will 
cause  the  single  point  of  failure  due  to  the  lack  of  a 
tamper-proof module in smart meters. Beaver and col-
leagues (2002;  tinyurl.com/qcgsgth) proposed an element-
ary  key-establishment  scheme  called  SKE  for  SCADA 
systems.  Whereas  the  master-slave  communications 
are  secured  by  symmetric-key  schemes,  the  peer-to-
peer  communications  are  protected  by  public-key 
schemes. However, the scheme proposed by these au-
thors  does  not  support  efficient  multicast  and  broad-
cast  authentication  in  the  smart  grid.  Dawson  and 
colleagues  (2006;  tinyurl.com/lkkoxgb)  proposed  SKMA,  a 
key management scheme for SCADA systems. These au-
thors  introduced  a  key-distribution  centre  (KDC)  and 
each node maintains two types of long-term keys: node-
to-KDC  and  node-to-node.  A  session  key  in  SKMA  is 
generated  using  the  node-to-node  key.  Unfortunately, 
SKMA  does  not  consider  issues  of  multicast,  key  up-
date,  and  revocation.  Choi  and  colleagues  described 
ASKMA  (2009;  tinyurl.com/mooapta)  and  ASKMA+  (2010; 
tinyurl.com/ml2kvqm) for key management in SCADA sys-
tems,  respectively.  Both  schemes  are  designed  based 
on the usage of a logical key hierarchy (LKH), which is 
able  to  achieve  efficient  key  management  among  all 
nodes.  In  particular,  ASKMA  supports  both  multicast 
and broadcast authentication and the performance has 
been further improved in ASKMA+. 
Although  many  encryption,  authentication,  and  key-
management schemes have been proposed, their per-
formance does not seem to fulfill the stringent timing 
requirements of the smart grid. Therefore, fine-grained 
and  advanced  security  protocols  still  need  to  be  de-
veloped  for  protecting  different  communication  net-
works in smart grids.
In a smart grid, the utility company needs the real-time 
power-consumption data for planning purposes as well 
as for providing accurate and authentic billing. For the 
utility company, the correctness of the calculated bills 
is the most important issue. However, from the custom-
er’s perspective, privacy is the main concern. Research-
ers  have  designed  privacy-preserving  billing  protocols 
using advanced cryptographic techniques such as zero-
knowledge  proof  (tinyurl.com/2z5blx)  and  homomorphic 
encryption  (tinyurl.com/depohp).  Bohil  and  colleagues 
(2010; tinyurl.com/mmfv5kt) proposed a privacy model for 
smart metering, in which a trusted third-party proxy is 
introduced  to  collect  meter  readings  from  individual 
customers  and  aggregate  data  before  forwarding  it  to 
the utility company. Later on, Garcia and Jacobs (2012; 
tinyurl.com/kmxnnh7)  proposed  the  use  of  homomorphic 
encryption to prevent the utility company from access-
ing  the  power  consumption  data  of  individual  house-
holds. Using those advanced cryptographic techniques, 
utility  companies  only  receive  the  commitments 
(tinyurl.com/ljgcasm) of the real-time power consumption 
instead of the raw data from smart meters, and custom-
ers can prove to the utility company that a utility bill 
has been correctly generated. 
Besides  research  into  addressing  general  privacy  con-
cerns for the smart grid, a number of researchers have 
been focusing on designing and implementing privacy-
preserving billing protocols. Rial and colleagues (2011; 
tinyurl.com/lha6zpf) proposed a privacy-preserving billing 
protocol in which the power-consumption data is sent 
to the user along with other information from the smart 
meter, and the user computes the bill based on the pri-
cing  policy  during  each  billing  period.  After  that,  the 
user sends the proof of correct computation to the util-
ity  company,  where  a  homomorphic  commitment 
scheme has been used to construct the proof. Kursawe 
and colleagues (2011;  tinyurl.com/ldc7cfx) presented a set 
of protocols that can be used to privately compute ag-
gregate  meter  measurements  over  defined  sets  of 
meters  without  revealing  any  additional  information 
about  the  individual  meter  readings.  Moreover,  their Technology Innovation Management Review July 2013
48 www.timreview.ca
Security Challenges in Smart-Grid Metering and Control Systems
Xinxin Fan and Guang Gong
protocols also allow for detection of fraud and leakage 
as  well  as  network  management  and  statistical  pro-
cessing of meter measurements. Molina-Markham and 
colleagues  (2012;  tinyurl.com/mjyz2a8)  implemented  the 
privacy-preserving billing protocol proposed by Rial on 
a MSP430-based microcontroller and verified the feas-
ibility of designing privacy-preserving smart meters us-
ing low-cost microcontrollers.
Future Outlook
The smart-grid metering and control system consists of 
heterogeneous  wired  and  wireless  networks  and 
devices from various domains. Each sub-system in the 
smart grid currently follows the different standards and 
regulations  and  has  distinct  security  requirements.  In 
particular, the smart grid faces unique challenges stem-
ming  from  the  combination  of  stringent  security  re-
quirements,  limited  computational  resources, 
time-critical  message  delivery  and  responses,  and  the 
use of heterogeneous networks with multiple authentic-
ation and protection mechanisms. Although a lot of ef-
forts  have  been  made  by  industry  and  academia  to 
address  a  wide  range  of  security  issues  in  the  smart 
grid,  there  are  still  many  challenges  that  need  to  be 
tackled  before  smart  grids  can  be  widely  deployed. 
From  the  viewpoint  of  cryptographic  technique,  we 
highlight  several  research  areas  and  directions  that 
need to be further investigated. 
A lightweight cipher suite for smart-grid devices
The  tight  cost  and  resource  constraints  inherent  in 
mass deployments of smart-grid devices bring forward 
impending  requirements  for  implementing  a  light-
weight cipher suite that can perform strong authentica-
tion  and  encryption,  and  provide  other  security 
functionalities. Previous research has shown that using 
classical cryptographic algorithms that are designed for 
full-fledged  computers  has  become  the  bottleneck  in 
many  smart-grid  applications.  In  order  to  meet  the 
stringent time requirements in a smart grid, it is highly 
desirable to standardize a set of lightweight symmetric-
key  and  asymmetric-key  ciphers  for  securing  smart-
grid applications.
Advanced key management for smart-grid networks
Encryption and authentication are crucial cryptograph-
ic processes in a smart grid, because they protect data 
integrity and confidentiality, and an efficient key-man-
agement scheme is the foundation that ensures the se-
cure operation of a smart grid. Because a smart grid is 
composed of heterogeneous communication networks 
and  involves  symmetric-key  and  asymmetric-key 
cryptosystems, a large set of cryptographic keys need to 
be managed in an efficient manner. A sophisticated key-
management framework needs to be designed to deal 
with security services as well as the seamless handover 
of  those  services  across  different  sub-systems  in  the 
smart grid.
Privacy-preserving operations in smart-grid networks
Smart-grid  communications  have  raised  serious  con-
cerns about user privacy due to the possibility of infer-
ring customers’ behaviour and habits from the detailed 
energy usage information, which can lead to potential 
risks  that  consumers  would  be  vulnerable  to  criminal 
activities  and  personal  information  leakage.  Advanced 
privacy-preserving  security  schemes  need  to  be  de-
veloped and integrated into smart-grid networks to en-
able utility companies to perform the regular business 
operations such as customer billing only using aggreg-
ated  power-consumption  information.  The  real-time 
power consumption data should only be accessible by 
individual customers. 
Conclusion
Smart-grid metering and control systems hold enorm-
ous promise for improving efficiency, convenience, and 
sustainability.  However,  the  complicated  and  hetero-
geneous  system  architecture  has  made  securing  the 
smart  grid  particularly  challenging.  Cybersecurity  in 
the  smart-grid  metering  and  control  system  is  an  im-
portant and rapidly evolving area that has attracted at-
tention  from  government,  industry,  and  academia.  In 
this article, we introduced the high-level architecture of 
a smart-grid metering and control system, detailed the 
system's security requirements, summarized the recent 
efforts  from  industry  and  academia,  and  highlighted 
several  areas  and  directions  for  further  research.  Our 
objective is to shed some light on cybersecurity in the 
smart  grid  and  to  trigger  the  close  collaborations 
among government, industry, and academia. 
Based on our discussion in this article, it is clear that im-
plementing an integrated and fine-grained security solu-
tion  that  is  able  to  address  potential  security  and 
privacy issues in each sub-system of a smart grid is crit-
ical  to  guarantee  its  successful  deployment.  Moreover, 
the design of security solutions should take into account 
the salient features of the smart grid as well as the un-
derlying power system. Looking to the future, the joint 
efforts from industry and academia will make the era of 
“smart energy” become reality at a staggering speed. Technology Innovation Management Review July 2013
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